Budget Allocation and the Revealed Social Rate of Time Preference for Health by Paulden, Mike & Claxton, Karl Philip
This is a repository copy of Budget Allocation and the Revealed Social Rate of Time 
Preference for Health.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/139298/
Version: Published Version
Monograph:
Paulden, Mike and Claxton, Karl Philip orcid.org/0000-0003-2002-4694 (2009) Budget 
Allocation and the Revealed Social Rate of Time Preference for Health. Discussion Paper. 
CHE Research Paper . Centre for Health Economics, University of York , York, UK. 
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless 
indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by 
national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of 
the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record 
for the item. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
Budget Allocation and the Revealed Social
Rate of Time Preference for Health
CHE Research Paper 53
Budget Allocation and the Revealed Social Rate
of Time Preference for Health
Mike Paulden1,2
Karl Claxton1,3
1Centre for Health Economics, University of York, UK
2Toronto Health Economics and Technology Assessment (THETA)
Collaborative, University of Toronto, Canada
3Department of Economics and Related Studies, University of York, UK
October 2009
Background
CHE Discussion Papers (DPs) began publication in 1983 as a means of making current
research material more widely available to health economists and other potential users. So
as to speed up the dissemination process, papers were originally published by CHE and
distributed by post to a worldwide readership.
The new CHE Research Paper series takes over that function and provides access to current
research output via web-based publication, although hard copy will continue to be available
(but subject to charge).
Disclaimer
Papers published in the CHE Research Paper (RP) series are intended as a contribution to
current research. Work and ideas reported in RPs may not always represent the final position
and as such may sometimes need to be treated as work in progress. The material and views
expressed in RPs are solely those of the authors and should not be interpreted as
representing the collective views of CHE research staff or their research funders.
Further copies
Copies of this paper are freely available to download from the CHE website
www.york.ac.uk/inst/che/pubs. Access to downloaded material is provided on the
understanding that it is intended for personal use. Copies of downloaded papers may be
distributed to third-parties subject to the proviso that the CHE publication source is properly
acknowledged and that such distribution is not subject to any payment.
Printed copies are available on request at a charge of £5.00 per copy. Please contact the
CHE Publications Office, email che-pub@york.ac.uk, telephone 01904 321458 for further
details.
Centre for Health Economics
Alcuin College
University of York
York, UK
www.york.ac.uk/inst/che
© Mike Paulden, Karl Claxton.
Budget allocation and the revealed social rate of time preference for health  i 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Appropriate decisions based on cost-effectiveness evaluations of health care technologies depend 
upon the cost-effectiveness threshold and its rate of growth as well as some social rate of time 
preference for health.  The concept of the cost-effectiveness threshold, social rate of time preference 
for consumption and social opportunity cost of capital are briefly explored before the question of how 
a social rate of time preference for health might be established is addressed.  A more traditional 
approach to this problem is outlined before a social decision making approach is developed which 
demonstrates that social time preference for health is revealed through the budget allocations made 
by a socially legitimate higher authority.  The relationship between the social time preference rate for 
health, the growth rate of the cost-effectiveness threshold and the rate at which the higher authority 
can borrow or invest is then examined.  We establish that the social time preference rate for health is 
implied by the budget allocation and the health production functions in each period.  As such, the 
social time preference rate for health depends not on the social time preference rate for consumption 
or growth in the consumption value of health but on growth in the cost-effectiveness threshold and the 
rate at which the higher authority can save or borrow between periods.  The implications for 
discounting and the policies of bodies such as NICE are then discussed.  
 
JEL Classification: I18, H43 
 
Keywords: Economic evaluation. Discounting. Cost-effectiveness analysis 
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Introduction 
 
Economic evaluation of health technologies, specifically cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA), is 
commonly seen as a means of satisfying an explicit social objective subject to an exogenous budget 
constraint (Gold et al., 1996; Drummond et al.,   :LWKLQ WKLV µVRFLDO GHFLVLRQ PDNLQJ
SHUVSHFWLYH¶&($FDQQRWEHXVHGWRPDNHFODLPVDERXWVRFLDOZHOIDUHRUWKHRSWLPDOLW\RURWKHUZLVH
of the budget for health care; its role is more modest, claiming to inform social decisions within the 
health care sector rather than prescribing social choice in general.  It is this role that CEA has tended 
to play in policy and it fits well with the view (Claxton et al., 2007; Claxton et al., forthcoming) that 
decision making bodies such as NICE in the UK can be seen as the agent of a socially legitimate 
higher authority which is unable to express an explicit, complete and coherent social welfare function.  
These circumstances can be regarded as a hierarchy (Mookherjee, 2006) where the agent (NICE) 
acts as a delegated authority but one that cannot be asked to improve social welfare, since it cannot 
be specified by the principal.  Rather, the principal allocates resources and gives the agent a 
responsibility to pursue explicit and specific objectives (such as maximising the present value of 
health).  The implications of this process reveal a partial but socially legitimate expression of some 
unknown underlying latent social welfare function.  For example, the budget allocated by the higher 
authority implies a particular cost-effectiveness threshold which is a revealed expression of how much 
society wishes to pay for improvements in health generated by collectively funded health care. 
 
In these circumstances, appropriate decisions made by the agent based on cost-effectiveness 
evaluations of health care technologies depend upon the cost-effectiveness threshold, tk , in each 
period t , the growth rate of the cost-effectiveness threshold, kg , (such that 1 1t t kk k g ), and 
some social rate of time preference for health, hr  (Claxton et al., in submission).1  For a technology 
with costs and effects in two time periods, a decision rule expressed in terms of discounted net health 
benefit is to accept the technology if: 
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where th  and tc  represent the incremental health effects and incremental costs in period t  of 
accepting the technology, both discounted at a common rate of hr .  Alternatively, the decision rule 
can be rearranged and expressed DVDFRPSDULVRQRIWKHWHFKQRORJ\¶VLQFUHPHQWDOFRVWHIIHFWLYHQHVV
ratio (ICER) to the current period cost-effectiveness threshold, 1k .  The technology should be 
accepted if (see Claxton et al., in submission)2: 
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The discount rate applied to th  remains:  
 
hh rd ,       (3) 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Such decisions also necessarily assume divisibility and constant returns (Birch and Gafni, 1993). 
2
 It is plausible to assume that hr  and kg  are small so that: )1().1()1).(1( khkhkhhk grgrgrrg  
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but the discount rate applied to tc  becomes: 
 
c h kd r g ,        (4) 
 
because some adjustment of the discount rate is needed to reflect any growth in tk , e.g.  if 0kg  (
0kg ) then future costs are less (more) important because they displace less (more) health and this 
can be reflected in a higher (lower) discount rate.  Therefore, a common discount rate of hr is required 
if the cost-effectiveness threshold is believed to be constant over the period where costs differ.  
However, if 0kg  and decisions are based on an ICER decision rule, differential discounting of 
costs and health effects is required (Claxton et al., in submission). 
 
Irrespective of whether the decision maker adopts a decision rule based on ICERs or on discounted 
net health benefit, appropriate estimates of th , tc , hr  and tk  are required to ensure that decisions 
are made in line with objective delegated to the agent by the higher authority (which for the purposes 
of this paper is taken to be to maximise the present value of health).  While the modelling of health 
care technologies to obtain estimates of th  and tc  is now well-established, there is far less 
understanding of: i) what the cost-effectiveness threshold, tk , represents and how this threshold 
might change over time; ii) what rate of time preference for health, hr , ought to be used by the agent 
in making decisions within the health sector; iii)  how hr  might be related to the budget allocations 
made by the higher authority and the resulting values of tk ; and iv) how  hr  is related to the social 
rate of time preference for consumption, cr , and the social opportunity cost of capital, sr . 
 
This paper is presented as follows.  The concepts of the cost-effectiveness threshold, social rate of 
time preference for consumption and social opportunity cost of capital are briefly explored before a 
discussion of how a rate of time preference for health might be established.  A more traditional 
approach to this problem is outlined before a social decision making approach is developed which 
demonstrates that social time preference for health is revealed through the budget allocations made 
by a socially legitimate higher authority.  The relationships between hr , tk , kg  and cr  or sr are then 
examined.  The implications for discounting and the policies of bodies such as NICE are then 
discussed. 
 
 
The cost-effectiveness threshold 
 
The cost effectiveness threshold represents an estimate of health forgone as other health care 
activities are displaced within a budget constrained health care system to accommodate any 
additional costs of a technology approved by the agent (McCabe et al., 2008).  A national body, such 
as NICE, needs an estimate of what is expected to be forgone across the health care system in each 
period.  This will change as circumstances are expected to change, tending to rise with increases in 
budget and health care costs but tending to fall with increases in productivity (Culyer et al., 2007). 
 
In each period the state of technology and the efficiency of the health care system as well as the 
prevailing prices of inputs can be regarded as fixed.  In these circumstances it is reasonable to 
assume that health output, tH , is a positive function of the health system budget in that period, tB , 
and that this function is concave so that incremental increases in the budget result in diminishing 
marginal increases in health output:  
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Figure 1. Health production and the threshold 
 
 
This relationship between budget and health output in two periods is illustrated in Figure 1.  The 
threshold, tk , is the reciprocal of the slope at the point on the production function corresponding to the 
budget.3  6LQFH WKH VORSH RI WKH SURGXFWLRQ IXQFWLRQ UHSUHVHQWV WKH µVKDGRZ SULFH¶ RI WKH EXGJHW
(health gained for a marginal increase in budget), the threshold is the reciprocal of this shadow price.  
In period t  the prices of inputs and technology are fixed so tk  will unambiguously increase with the 
budget, i.e. tk  is greater at B2 than at B1.  However, whether or not tk increases over time will depend 
on changes in prices, technology as well as the budget.  In Figure 1, 1 1 1t t tH F B  is drawn to 
represent a health care system that is more productive in the next period, possibly due to innovation 
in health technology and medicine, greater efficiency in the delivery of health care services and/or a 
fall in the prices of particular inputs, e.g. due to the entry of generic drugs.  In these circumstances, 
with a constant budget of B2, the threshold will fall ( 1t tk k ).  As such, the threshold will not 
necessarily grow with increases in the budget and only if the effect of budget growth is greater than 
that of improvements in productivity.  Figure 1 illustrates this situation where the effect on the 
threshold of an increase in budget from B1 in t  to B2 in 1t  more than offsets that of the growth in 
productivity (so 1t tk k ); nevertheless, kg  is much smaller than if prices and technology had 
remained unchanged. 
 
In making an assessment of whether tk  is likely to increase with the budget it is also necessary to 
consider whether the agent has full and equal discretion over all types of health care expenditure.  For 
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example, if any growth in the overall budget is spent on national initiatives or other activities that 
FDQQRWRUFDQQRWHDVLO\EHGLVSODFHGE\WKHDJHQW¶VGHFLVLRQVWKHQDQ\DGGLWLRQDOFRVWVRIDSSURYHG
technologies must be accommodated by displacing other more effective activities elsewhere.  If none 
of the additional budget is spent on activities that can be displaced then the threshold will remain 
constant (or fall with increased productivity).  Therefore, it is growth in expenditure on more 
µGLVFUHWLRQDU\¶ SDUWV RI WKH EXGJHW DQG FKDQJHV LQ WKH SURGXFWLYLW\ DQG LQSXW SULFHV RI WKRVH KHDOWh 
care activities which more likely to be displaced which are most relevant.  
 
 
The social time preference rate 
 
The social rate of time preference for consumption, cr , often referred to simply as the social time 
preference rate (STPR), represents the proportionate increase in consumption required in period 1t  
for society in period t  to be indifferent between period t  and period 1t  consumption.  It is subject 
to an extensive literature (Ramsey, 1928; HM Treasury, 2003; Zhuang et al., 2007), and is generally 
regarded as comprising of three elements: a catastrophic risk premium; a rate of pure time 
preference; and a third element which accounts for the diminishing marginal utility of future 
consumption when per capita consumption is expected to increase over time.  Therefore, STPR 
represents social preferences over current and future consumption but the particular value of cr  is 
also linked to production possibilities and the observed rates of return to capital.    
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Intertemporal choice and production 
 
The social time preference for consumption and the possibilities of transforming current consumption 
into future consumption through investment returns are simply illustrated over two periods in Figure 2.  
Social preferences for consumption between the two periods can be described by the dashed 
indifference curve which represents an intertemporal social welfare function (ISWF).  The slope at any 
point on the ISWF is given by 1 cr  and describes the rate at which society is willing to trade 
current for future consumption.  However, which point on the ISWF society will chose to locate 
depends on the intertemporal production possibilities, i.e. how current consumption can be 
transformed into future consumption by forgoing current consumption which can be invested at a rate 
of return to provide future consumption opportunities.  These production possibilities are described by 
Slope =  -(1+rc)=  -(1+ rs) 
 
 0 Ct*  
Ct+1* 
ISWF 
 
IPPF 
 
Consumption in 
period t (Ct) 
 
Consumption in 
period t+1 (Ct+1) 
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the intertemporal production possibility frontier (IPPF).  The shape of the IPPF is determined by the 
marginal productivity of capital, which in this case exhibits markedly diminishing returns.  The slope at 
any point on the IPPF is given by 1 sr , where sr  represents the marginal rate of return on 
capital.  In the absence of distortions it also represents the social opportunity cost of capital, i.e. the 
social value of what is forgone elsewhere by government using capital (borrowing) for other purposes 
(Pearce and Nash, 1981; Gold et al., 1996). 
 
If society chooses to consume at point Ct*, Ct+1* this presumably is a point on the highest attainable 
ISWF which must be tangent to the IPPF.  At this point the slope of the ISWF and IPPF are equal and 
STPR must be equal to the marginal rate of return (so c sr r ).  Therefore, STPR can be estimated 
directly from the sum of its elements or inferred from observed rates of return (Gold et al., 1996).  For 
H[DPSOHWKH8.7UHDVXU\KDVVWLSXODWHGSHUFHQWDVWKH³VWDQGDUGUHDOGLVFRXQWUDWH´IRUSXEOLF
sector investment appraisal (HM Treasury, 2003) based on the sum of the three elements: a pure 
time preference rate of 0.5%, a catastrophic risk premium of 1%, and 2% to represent the combined 
effect of the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption and the growth in per capita consumption.  
Alternatively, STPR could be inferred by observing sr , the rate at which the higher authority 
(government) can save or borrow.  If markets are complete and undistorted, and the higher authority 
that allocates budget is regarded as a safe investment, then s cr r , which would be equivalent to the 
real yield on a bond issued by the higher authority in period t  which matures in period 1t .  
However, where distortions exist, for example uncorrected negative externalities or corporate 
taxation, then observed market rates will tend to be higher than sr  (Pearce and Nash, 1981).  
Similarly, where there are effects on future generations capital markets may be incomplete and 
observed rates will tend to be higher than the social opportunity cost of capital (Dasgupta et al., 
1999).  For the purposes of the remaining discussion we denote sr  as the rate at which the higher 
authority that allocates resources is able to borrow or invest and initially assume that markets are 
complete and undistorted so that sr also represents the social opportunity cost of capital ( s cr r ). 
 
 
The rate of time preference for health 
 
A welfarist prescription 
 
Traditionally economic analysis is more ambitious than the social decision making perspective 
described earlier, claiming to make statements about social welfare and prescribing social choice 
rather than simply informing decisions made by an agent with devolved and narrowly defined 
responsibilities (Mishan, 1967; Boadway and Bruce, 1984).  This requires a particular view of social 
welfare, commonly resting on individual preferences revealed through choices that individuals make 
(especially in markets) or modified by specification of an explicit social welfare function which will 
have consumption as well as health as its arguments.  Since both consumption and health enter the 
social welfare function it provides a clear link between the social time preference rate for 
consumption, cr , and the social time preference rate for health, hr  (Gravelle and Smith, 2001).   
 
If consumption and health are either the only social arguments or they are separable from all other 
arguments of social value then decisions which maximise the consumption value of health will also 
maximise social welfare (Gravelle et al., 2007).  A decision based on net health benefits in (1) can be 
extended to express the consumption value of net health gains.  The technology should be accepted 
if: 
 
2 2 1 1 2 2
1 1
1 2(1 ) (1 )c c
v h v c v c
v h
r k k r
,    (5) 
 
where the consumption value of health in period t  (vt) is the amount of consumption in period t that is 
equivalent to 1 unit of health in period t and th  and tc  are both discounted at a common rate of cr .  
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This can also be expressed as a comparison of the ICER to the current cost effectiveness threshold 
(Claxton et al., in submission).  The technology should be accepted if4: 
 
1
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,     (6) 
 
where vg  is the growth rate in tv  such that 1 (1 )t t vv v g .  The discount rate applied to th  
becomes: 
 
vch grd ,       (7) 
 
because some adjustment of the discount rate for health is needed to reflect growth in tv , e.g. if 
0vg  then future health is more valuable in terms of consumption and this can be reflected in a 
lower discount rate.  The discount rate applied to tc  becomes: 
 
c c v k h kd r g g d g ,      (8) 
 
reflecting both growth in the consumption value of future health forgone and any changes in the rate 
at which future health will be  forgone ( kg ).  Therefore, the traditional approach to economic analysis 
provides a clear prescription for the social rate of time preference for health, and its relationship to the 
rate of time preference for consumption: 
 
h h c vd r r g .      (9) 
 
However, the clear prescription that h c vr r g  comes at some considerable cost.  Firstly, it requires 
specification of tv  and vg .  Even if a particular consumption value of health could be agreed, the 
social welfare function it presupposes is unlikely to be complete and capture everything of social 
value.  Nor is it likely to be carrying some broad consensus or social legitimacy, particularly when 
considering decisions with direct health impacts.  In this case it implies that health and consumption 
are the only arguments of social value, or that they are separable from other arguments (e.g. 
education, equity, social solidarity, etc.) in some more complete description of social welfare.  
Adopting an incomplete description will lead to prescriptions which conflict with other legitimate 
objectives of social policy and other social arguments which ± although difficult to formalise ± may be 
important (e.g. widely held notions of social justice, intertemporal health equity, etc.).  For example, 
observing 0vg  would suggest that greater social weight should be given to health gains for future 
patients, even though they are expected to enjoy more health, for no other reason than they are 
expected to have higher incomes and consume more than current patients.  This might be regarded 
as a socially unacceptable conflict with equity concerns and widely held notions that access to health 
care should not be based on income but on capacity to benefit.      
 
Furthermore, under this prescription, the budget allocation decisions made by a socially legitimate 
higher authority have no normative significance whatsoever.  Indeed, it is tv  alone which expresses 
social value.  The budget constraint and the implied value of tk  is not a legitimate expression of 
VRFLDO YDOXH  5DWKHU WKH KLJKHU DXWKRULW\¶V EXGJHW DOORFDWLRQ LV VLPSO\ D QXLVDQFH DQ inefficiency 
which prevents the maximisation of (this particular definition of) social welfare - unless by chance 
                                                 
4
 Using the plausible assumptions that cr , vg and kg  are small so that:  
)1()1/()1( vcvc grgr  and )1()1/()1).(1( vkcvkc ggrggr  
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t tv k  DQGWKHEXGJHWLVUHJDUGHGDVµRSWLPDO¶ZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHSUHVXSSRVHGZHOIDUHIXQFWLRQ,Q
short, it requires the imposition of a particular social welfare function, which will not be universally 
acceptable or even likely to carry some broad social consensus (Arrow, 1950; Sen, 1970), but 
nevertheless can stand above legitimate social democratic processes. 
 
A social decision making approach  
 
In contrast, the more modest social decision making perspective described earlier regards the value 
tk  as a revealed partial expression of the value society places on health generated by collectively 
funded health care.  Similarly, a partial but legitimate expression of the social time preference rate for 
health (generated by collectively funded health care) is also revealed by the allocation of budgets over 
time.  A simple two period model is used to graphically illustrate this in Figure 3.  It demonstrates that 
hr  is implied by the budget allocation and the health production functions in each period.  As such, hr
depends not on cr  and vg , but on growth in the cost-effectiveness threshold, kg , and the rate at 
which the higher authority can save or borrow between periods, sr , which will be equal to cr if 
markets are complete and undistorted.   
 
Budget allocation 
 
7KHKLJKHUDXWKRULW\¶VFKRLFHLQDOORFDWLQJWRWDOUHVRXUFHVEHWZHHQWZRSHULRGVLVLOOXVWUDWHGLQEROGLQ
the south west quadrant of Figure 3.  The total resources of *B  available at the start of period t must 
be fully allocated between the two periods, so for each possible choice of budget in period t, tB , there 
is a unique budget in period 1t , 1 ( * ).(1 )t t sB B B r .  Therefore, the budget constraint 
depends on the rate of return on those resources saved in period t to provide budget in 1t , i.e. sr  
is equal to ** * *B B B  in Figure 3. 
 
Production functions for health 
 
The relationship between budget allocated in each period and health output in each period is 
represented by the health production functions in the south east and north west quadrants.  In each 
period the state of technology and input prices can be regarded as fixed, however, just as in Figure 1, 
1tH  is drawn to represent a health care system that is more productive in the next period, e.g. due to 
innovation in medicine.  1tH  is also drawn conditional on budget allocated in period t, i.e. health care 
provided in period t with costs that fall on tB  may also generate health improvements in the next 
period which is reflected in the positive intercept of 1tH .  As in Figure 1,  the slope of each 
production function at the corresponding budget represents the shadow price of the budget constraint 
or the reciprocal of the cost-effectiveness threshold, tk  or 1tk .  Therefore, in making budget 
allocation choices between periods, the higher authority determines health output in both periods and 
in turn the respective thresholds.   
 
Intertemporal health production possibility frontier 
 
Each unique budget allocation described in the south west quadrant is, through the production 
functions described in the south east and north west quadrants, associated with a combination of 
health outputs in each period in the north east quadrant.  The combinations of tH  and 1tH  which 
result from the possible choices of  tB  and 1tB  describe the intertemporal health production 
possibilities frontier (IHPPF).  The slope of the IHPPF is given by )1(1 h
t
t r
dH
dH
, which 
represents the rate at which current health output can be transformed into future health through 
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budget reallocation.  The health production possibilities are determined by the productivity of the 
health care system in each period.  The choice for the higher authority is where to locate on the 
IHPPF by allocating health budgets over each period. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Budget allocation and time preference for health 
 
 
Revealed social time preference for health  
 
By allocating budget between periods the higher authority in effect chooses a point on the IHPPF.  It 
is reasonable to suppose that this point is regarded as socially preferred to other possible points that 
could have been chosen by allocating the budget in a different way.  Therefore, the slope of the 
IHPPF at this point not only represents how current health can be transformed into future health but 
also reveals the rate at which the higher authority is willing to trade current for future health, i.e. an 
expression of social time preference for health.  This expression is only partial in the sense that a 
complete intertemporal social welfare function cannot be specified and there will be many other 
arguments of social value at play when budget allocations are made.  Therefore, although the dotted 
line in the north east quadrant suggests an indifference curve with common properties, it remains 
unknown.  The things that can be reasonably known are tB , 1tB , the associated estimates of tk  and 
1tk  and therefore hr  at the chosen point on the IHPPF.     
Deriving hr  from sr and kg  
 
The relationship between the revealed social rate of time preference for health, the rate at which the 
higher authority can borrow and invest and the growth in the cost effectiveness threshold can be 
 0 
Ht+1=F t+1(Bt+1) 
B* 
IHPPF 
Budget constraint 
Ht=F t(Bt) 
 
Ht 
 
Bt 
 
Bt+1 
 
Ht+1 
 
Slope =  1/kt+1 
Slope =  -(1+rh) 
Slope =  1/kt 
B* 
 
B** 
 
Slope =  -(1+rs) 
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established.  For example, consider an increase in the period t  budget of tB .  This will result in an 
increase in health output in period t  of 
t
t
k
B
.  Given that the total budget for the two periods is 
constrained, this increase in the period t  budget is financed by borrowing against the period 1t  
budget at an interest rate of sr , resulting in a decrease in the period 1t  budget of .(1 )t sB r .  This 
in turn results in a decrease in period 1t  health output of 
1
.(1 )t s
t
B r
k
, which can be discounted to 
represent the decrease in terms of period t  health as 
1
.(1 )
.(1 )
t s
t h
B r
k r
.   
 
For the budgets chosen by the higher authority to be consistent with its objective of maximising the 
present value of health, there must be no discounted net health benefit to choosing an alternative pair 
of budgets.  Where tB  is marginal, the resulting increase in period t  health output is therefore 
equivalent to the resulting decrease in period 1t  health output represented in terms of period t  
health: 
1
.(1 )
.(1 )
t t s
t t h
B B r
k k r
.   
This rearranges to 1
1
1
t s
t h
k r
k r
 and, since k
t
t g
k
k 11 , this rearranges to: 
 
1 1
1
s
h
k
r
r
g
.      (10) 
 
 
Where sr  and kg  are small, this simplifies to: 
  
h s kr r g       (11) 
If markets are undistorted, so s cr r , then kch grr , which is very similar to the traditional 
welfarist prescription in (9).  The important difference is that it is growth in the social value of health 
revealed by budget allocation that matters rather than growth in the consumption value of health 
derived from some external social welfare function. 
 
7KXV WKHKLJKHUDXWKRULW\¶V UDWHRI WLPHSUHIHUHQFH IRUKHDOWK hr , may be derived from the interest 
rate the higher authority faces, sr , and the growth rate of the cost-effectiveness threshold, kg .  Since 
the threshold in each period (and, in turn, the rate of growth of the threshold, kg ) is determined by 
WKH EXGJHWV VHW E\ WKH KLJKHU DXWKRULW\ WKH VHWWLQJ RI WKHVH EXGJHWV LPSOLHV WKH KLJKHU DXWKRULW\¶V
preferred value of hr .  This derivation of hr  is intuitive.  Where 0kg , hr  is simply the rate at which 
the higher authority can borrow or save, sr .  If sr  increases, it becomes relatively more desirable to 
decrease tB  and increase 1tB  so as to take advantage of the higher interest rate; for a particular set 
RIEXGJHWVWRUHPDLQFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHKLJKHUDXWKRULW\¶VREMHFWLYHWKHUHIRUHUHTXLUHVDKLJKHUUDWHRI
time preference for health, hr .  Meanwhile, any increase in kg  makes it relatively more desirable to 
increase tB  at the expense of 1tB , since relatively less health is forgone due to a marginal decrease 
in the budget in period 1t  (due to the relatively higher threshold) than is gained due to the marginal 
increase in the budget in period t .  As such, for a particular set of budgets to remain consistent with 
WKHKLJKHUDXWKRULW\¶VREMHFWLYHUHTXLUHVDORZHUUDWH of time preference for health, hr . 
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Appropriate discount rates in CEA 
 
The discount rates to apply when cost-effectiveness is expressed as an ICER can be based on 
information which is already assumed to be available.  The discount rate applied to th  from (3) 
becomes:  
 
h s kd r g ,       (12) 
 
and the discount rate applied to tc  from (4) becomes5: 
 
sc rd .       (13) 
  
It should be noted that where 0kg , hc dd , so differential discounting of costs and health effects 
is only appropriate when there is expected to be growth in the cost-effectiveness threshold.  If the UK 
Treasury rate of 3.5% is regarded as an appropriate estimate of the STPR and if markets are 
regarded as complete and undistorted (so s cr r ) then the current NICE policy of discounting costs 
and health effects at 3.5% will be appropriate if the cost-effectiveness threshold is expected to be 
constant over the period where there are incremental costs and health benefits associated with the 
technology in question. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
A social decision making perspective regards bodies such as NICE as the agents of a socially 
legitimate higher authority that allocates budget to the health care system.  Estimates of th , tc , 
and tk  are required by the agent to ensure that decisions are made in line with the objective 
delegated by the higher authority.  In addition, an instruction from the higher authority as to the rate at 
which it can borrow or invest when allocating resources, sr , is also needed.  However, the social rate 
of time preference for health is not a choice that the agent can or should make.  Rather, just like the 
cost-effectiveness threshold, it is revealed through budget allocation decisions.  Therefore, not only is 
tk  a revealed (albeit partial) expression of social value, but h s kr r g  is also a revealed but partial 
expression of the social rate of time preference for health generated by collectively funded health 
care.  The relationship between hr  derived in this way and cr  depends on whether there are no 
distortions in capital and product markets and on whether the cost-effectiveness threshold is constant.  
If both these conditions hold then s cr r , 0kg  and the current NICE policy of discounting costs 
and health effects at 3.5% would be correct if the current UK Treasury estimate of the STPR is 
deemed appropriate.  However, there are good reasons to suppose that this rate is too high.  Aside 
from the difficulty of basing STPR on dubious estimates of each of its 3 elements, a real rate of return 
of 3.5% far exceeds observed marginal rates of return - even before any adjustments are made for 
distortions (e.g. environmental externalities or intergenerational effects), which would be required to 
estimate a social opportunity cost of capital.  Importantly, from a social decision making perspective, a 
real rate of 3.5% is far in excess of current real yields on UK government bonds - as of 30 September 
                                                 
5
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1
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r , substituting this into the formula for cd from Claxton et al. (in submission):  
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2009, real rates of 1.24%, 1.31% and 0.19% are expected at 5, 10 and 20 years respectively (Bank of 
England, 2009).  A lower common rate of discount might therefore be a more appropriate policy for 
NICE to adopt if the threshold is not expected to grow over relevant time horizons. 
 
If the threshold is expected to grow at the same rate as some consumption value of health based on 
individual preference or derived from an external social welfare function ( k vg g ) then, whether a 
welfarist prescription or social decision making perspective is adopted, the same discounting policy 
should be used as long as s cr r .  If it is assumed that the higher authority always allocates budget 
to maximise the welfare function that any chosen definition of tv  presupposes then budgets would 
QHFHVVDULO\ EH µRSWLPDO¶ ZLWK UHVSHFW WR WKLV GHILQLWLRQ RI VRFLDO ZHOIDUH DQG t tv k  and v kg g .  
However, this assumes that an explicit and complete welfare function can be specified which both 
describes social choice and how it is mediated through the social democratic process, i.e. precisely 
what the social decision making approach assumes is not possible.  Alternatively, it is possible to 
simply define v kg g  by assuming that the only expression of the value of health is the cost-
effectiveness threshold ± but now tv  and vg  are redundant because it is tk  and kg  that express 
social value.  In these circumstances it is not possible to appeal to evidence of 0vg  based on 
individual preferences or the analysis of particular welfare functions to justify 0kg .  There appear to 
be only two coherent positions to take: either assume budgets will match a chosen welfare function, in 
which case evidence of tv and vg  from the chosen welfare function would be relevant; or assume that 
budgets are an expression of some unknown, latent welfare function, in which case it is evidence of 
tk  and kg  that is relevant. 
 
Whether or not the threshold has been growing or is expected to grow over relevant time horizons is, 
in principle at least, an empirical question (Martin et al., 2008).  Simply observing real growth in the 
budget for health care, however, is not sufficient evidence for 0kg .  It will also depend on 
improvements in the productivity of health care and whether any increased expenditure is 
GLVFUHWLRQDU\DQGµGLVSODFHDEOH¶E\1,&(JXLGDQFHOver recent years much of the real budget growth 
in the UK NHS has been devoted to national initiatives that are not easily displaced, e.g. new 
contracts for General Practitioners and consultants, national waiting time targets, information 
technology initiatives, etc.  It also includes the guidance issued by NICE itself, which is mandatory.  
Therefore, any real growth in what remains will have been much more modest and more likely to be 
offset by growth in the productivity of displaceable activities, e.g. drugs, devices, procedures and 
other services.  Similarly, although there has been a general rise in input prices for the UK NHS, 
much of this inflation has been driven by staff as well as capital and overhead costs, a great deal of 
which cannot easily be displaced.  What are more relevant are the prices of inputs which could be 
displaced, an important element of which is drug prices.  Although branded drug prices have tended 
to rise, at the same time there has been generic entry on patent expiry with dramatic reductions in 
prices (Office of Fair Trading, 2007).  As such, it is not self evident that the threshold has grown over 
recent years, despite real increases in the budget for health care; in any case, growth in the threshold 
seems much less likely in the future with the prospect of reduced budget growth, increased pressures 
to improve productivity and downward pressure on input prices. 
 
Under a social decision making perspective, the allocation of budget illustrated in Figure 3 is not, and 
cannot, be assXPHG WR EH µRSWLPDO¶  7RPDNH FODLPV DERXW WKH RSWLPDOLW\ RU RWKHUZLVH RI EXGJHWV
SRVHVWKHTXHVWLRQµRSWLPDO¶ZLWKUHVSHFWWRZKDW"7KHµZKDW¶FDQRQO\EHVRPHFRPSOHWHRUDWOHDVW
separable) description of social welfare.  However, the premise of a social decision making 
perspective is that a complete, explicit and legitimate expression of social welfare is not possible.  If 
that premise is acceptable (it quite reasonably may not be) then all else seems to follow.  All that can 
be said is that the budgets are allocated by a legitimate social process which is tasked with balancing 
ever-changing competing and contradictory claims on resources and conflicting social objectives.  
Therefore, the budgets allocated by this process, including allocations between sectors other than 
KHDOWKZLOOQRWJHQHUDOO\DSSHDUµRSWLPDO¶ZKHQFRPSDUHGZLWKDQ\VSHFLILFVRFLDOZHOIDUHIXQFWLRQWKDW
might be specified.  The implications within the health sector (the thresholds and the implied social 
rate of time preference for health) are revealed and legitimate, but can only be regarded as a partial 
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expression of social value.  In summary, it appears that both the welfarist and social decision making 
perspectives are internally consistent.  What distinguishes them is the assumption - on which 
discounting and other policy questions turn - of whether a complete, explicit and legitimate expression 
of social welfare is possible.   
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